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Abstract: "is paper explores the role of cognitive issues in learning from crisis situations, in 
particular the managers’ mental representations of crisis and the relationship of these “maps” 
with the learning process through “sense-making”, as well as the possible cognitive barriers 
that might prevent the process of learning from crisis and thus allow the incubation of crises 
to develop in the company. Reviewing secondary data from the current literature, the paper 
focuses on the complexity of human “sense-making” and understanding the phenomena of 
crisis and the meaning people assign to it. Considerable attention and analysis has been done 
in order to assess the manner in which organizations can e#ectively learn to prevent crisis 
situations, addressing the theoretical frameworks that analyse the barriers that might occur 
in the learning from crisis process at an individual and group level, pointing out the need of 
recognition and sense-making that sometimes the current state of knowledge is not well. "e 
paper argues that the e#ective organizational learning from crises requires changes in the core 
beliefs, values and assumptions of organizational members, which translate into sustained 
behavioural changes and that these changes are possible through intense cognitive processes, 
in particular through the way managers make sense of crisis situations. 
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Introduction
Considerable attention and research has been done in order to assess the man-
ner in which organizations can e!ectively learn to prevent crisis situations, 
addressing the theoretical frameworks that analyse the barriers that might oc-
cur in the learning from crisis process at an individual and group level, point-
ing out the need of recognition and sense-making that sometimes the current 
state of knowledge is not well. 
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Yet, less consideration has been given to the role of cognitive issues in learning 
from crisis situations and in particular to the role of the managers’ mental rep-
resentation of crisis and the relationship of these maps with the learning pro-
cess through sense-making, while considering the individual defence mecha-
nisms and the possible faulty beliefs, assumptions and rationalizations present 
at the group and organizational level. Moreover, the adoption of the new rules 
and breaking of the old ones brought uncertainties about the responsibility 
and accountability of managing problems, which later on led to obstruction of 
crisis prevention, preparedness and di"culties in response phase. #is over-
all macro-economic and political environment, in connection with the latest 
development all over EU and worldwide, are in$uencing the way individual 
companies are coping with the situation and %nally understand to manage 
crisis. 
In this respect, this paper emphasizes the role of cognitive issues in learning 
from crisis situations. In particular, it focuses on managers’ mental represen-
tations of crisis and the relationship of these “maps” with the learning process 
through “sense-making”, as well as the possible cognitive barriers that might 
prevent the process of learning from crisis. In other words, we consider the 
theoretical concepts that address the organizational learning process, as well 
as the barriers that might occur in the process of learning and that organiza-
tions incubate by themselves the potential for disaster through faulty assump-
tions, which %nally impacts over the control and management systems.
Understanding crisis in a dynamic context 
It is important in our analysis to integrate the main theories and theoretical 
frameworks in relation with crisis and organizational learning process, as well 
as barriers to learning, in order to understand in more depth the cognitive is-
sues that lie at the level of individual, group and organization. 
#e phenomenon of crisis has attracted extensive attention from the scholars 
from all kinds of %elds and disciplines in an attempt to de%ne and conceptual-
ize it. Crisis is a much too complex and complicated phenomenon to be easily 
de%ned. Yet some of the early de%nitions given by scholars describe crisis as 
an event that threatens the most important goals of the companies such as 
survival and pro%tability, and is usually triggered by low probability events 
which cause extensive damage and social disruptions involving a variety of 
stakeholders (Smith, 1999; Shrivastava & Mitro!, 1987). Modern crises de%-
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nitions have addressed the issue of crisis from the perspective of stakeholders’ 
perception of concepts like threat, uncertainty and urgency: a severe threat 
or an unfavourable, destructive, life-threatening change of victims’ environ-
ment, with a high degree of uncertainty, very critical and o&en irreversible 
(Dubrovski, 2009; Malle, 2009; Kouzmin, 2008); the term crisis is attributable 
and encompasses all types of negative events and it is applied to situations that 
are considered to be unexpected, undesirable, unpredictable and unthinkable 
which most of the time produce uncertainty and disbelief (Milasinovic et al., 
2010; Heath et al., 2009).
#e de%nition of crisis, as well as the attributions of its causes is much too 
diversi%ed, as well as biased by the particular %led in which it is studied. A 
study made by Pauchant and Douville (1993) revealed the di!erent topics and 
frameworks that were used by di!erent authors in an attempt to de%ne crisis 
and crisis management. A central problem in trying to de%ne crisis are the 
ambiguities that surrounds the concept itself. In the present paper when re-
ferring to crisis we intend to mean organizational crisis and the impact that a 
particular organization can face when hit by crisis situations; and not “societal 
crisis” (Jaques, 2010, p.10) where the organization is a!ected only as part of 
broader context. 
#e process of de%ning crisis has not found yet a collective acceptance and a 
precise meaning of the concept itself. #e evolution of de%ning crisis starts 
from a traditional approach of seeing crisis as a purely adverse event that trig-
gers the focus of the organization on the incident response (Coombs, 2007; 
Davies, 2005) and thus positioning the crisis management along-side opera-
tional and tactical level, a reactive management, continuing further with a 
process approach of crisis being considered not only sudden events, but ac-
knowledging the existence of a period of red $ags and the need of the manag-
ers to proactively identify and implement processes and activities that prevent 
potential crisis and/or can mitigate the ones that do occur (‘t Hart et al., 2001; 
Pauchant & Mitro!, 1992). #e complementary relationship between the two 
approaches of de%ning crisis has been further argued and discussed and the 
need for a new approach emerged, which considers crisis management as a 
processum continuum, a fully integrated model that sees the need for manage-
ment systems to feed-back learning (Jaques, 2010; Jaques, 2009; Jaques, 2007, 
Roux-Dufort, 2000). 
#e de%nition of crisis faces its limitations and there is a considerable debate 
in the literature over the exact nature of this de%nition; even though there is 
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no collective acceptance about what crisis precisely means, there is a general 
acceptance of the fact that crises are situations that a!ect organizations as a 
system whole, challenging its previously held assumptions, o!ering urgent 
and novel decisions and actions, leading to potentially restructuring of the 
organization and a!ecting the system and basic assumptions of the system’s 
members (Swartz et al., 2003; Smith, 2002; Herbane et al., 1997; Elliott et al., 
2000; Turner, 1976). Scholars seem to agree on some key elements identi%ed 
in relation with crisis and these are: scale and severity of the event (which 
usually includes loss of reputation, loss of life and property damages); the 
manner and speed with which an adverse event escalates into the organiza-
tion as a whole; weak control systems and failure to detect the “near misses”; 
impaired communication and poor signal detection of adverse events; failure 
of the organization to detect and recognize the external warnings; the role and 
contribution of management, both as function and process, to the creation of 
conditions and climate within which errors might be generated and occur; 
full cultural readjustment as a direct consequence of the event, in the sense of 
fundamental changes in the assumptions and beliefs of the senior managers 
as well as of the organizational members (Milasinovic et al., 2010; Dubrovski, 
2009; Heath et al., 2009; Malle, 2009; Wicks, 2001; Smith, 1999; Swartz et al., 
1995; Turner, 1994; Smith & Sipika, 1993; Smith, 1990; Mitro! et al., 1989; 
Shrivastava & Mitro!, 1987). As Mitro! (2004) has mentioned in his works 
on crisis leadership the purpose of de%ning crisis is not to predict, but more 
to guide: “…it is not possible to give a precise de%nition of a crises because it is 
not possible to predict with certainty how a crisis will occur, when and why…” 
and when referring to organizational management he stated clearly that “… 
one sees the need for the Big Picture [1] thinking” (p.63).
Having in mind the aim of our study and in close connection with our in-
tention of de%ning crisis, we shall refer in particular to the last of key ele-
ment identi%ed above, namely the changes in the assumptions and believes of 
managers in times of crisis. As argued by Pauchant and Mitro! (1992) one of 
the three existential e!ects of crisis besides the threat that it can pose to the 
legitimacy of the entire industry and the reversal of the strategic mission of 
a company, is the e!ect that occurs at the individual level. Crises are able to 
disturb the way people perceive the world, as well as their identity and “their 
inner sense of self-worth… their inner cohesion” (p.16). Individuals use faulty 
rationalizations and denials in order to be able to escape terrifying experi-
ences, like the ones that crisis situations can bring. We will discuss in depth 
on the matters of faulty rationalization and defence mechanisms in the sections 
to come.
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For the purpose of this paper and its central theme we will consider the de%-
nition of Smith (2002) that a crisis is an event in which “a fundamental chal-
lenge is made to the core assumptions and beliefs held by management (s.n.: 
author’s underlying) about the nature of risk and the resultant exposure of 
the limitations of the various control mechanisms in place to deal with those 
risks” (p.61). Also, it is important to conceptualise crisis that will contribute in 
its in-depth understanding. For this purpose the next two sections are focused 
on the systemic and complexity conceptualization of crisis.  
The systemic view of crisis 
Crises are known to occur in many forms. In order for companies to be able 
to fully address the matter of crisis and to be able to develop the right strategic 
approach in dealing with, it is necessary to understand the di!erent types of 
crises that can occur, as well as the multiple perspectives crises can be looked 
at. Crises, by their very nature, create for the organizations a series of problems 
to cope with, especially in terms of their capabilities and abilities to coordinate 
the activities in times of acute stress. A particular concern of the researchers in 
crises management has been concentrated on better understanding of the or-
ganizational cultural process of crises incubation. In his seminal work Turner 
(1976) argued that organizations incubate by themselves the potential for di-
saster through faulty assumptions, man-made disasters, which %nally impacts 
over the control and management systems. Turner’s idea that organizations 
can incubate themselves the potential for crisis was fundamental in shaping 
the agenda of crises management researchers. Mitro! et al. (1988a) argued for 
a model resulted from an organization-environment interaction with socio-
technical factors (See Figure 1). #e two dimensions were developed based on 
the Jungian typology which was, originally rooted in individual personality 
theory and later on were extended to the business area in analysing the orga-
nizational and strategic issues. When dealing with corporate crisis and crisis 
management, the need for considering not only the technical issues but also 
the human and social dimension is paramount. Organization must consider 
all dimensions when seeking to examine their basic sense of identity and thus 
modify their corporate culture (Shrivastava & Mitro!, 1987).
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Figure 1 – Types of Corporate Crises Triggering Events 
Source: Mitroff, Pauchant and Schrivastava (1988a)
Mitro! (2004) has further developed the crises typology and named it “Crises 
Portfolio” (p.60), clustering each type of crisis into di!erent families: econom-
ic, informational, physical, human resources, reputational, psychopathic acts 
and natural disasters. We are in line with his arguments that organizations 
have to: be prepared for at least one crises from each family type, as every 
type of crises can happen to every organization; “think about the unthinkable” 
prior to its occurrence; be prepare for simultaneous occurrence of multiple 
crises; be aware that every crises is in itself capable of being both the cause and 
the e!ect of another type of crises; look to the crises portfolio as a whole and 
with systemic view; spread the risk across all the families of crises and thus 
correct the limited oversight of only considering those that the organization 
has already experienced; see the interconnection between all types of crises. 
Having the overall picture of the crises portfolio, thinking and considering 
each type in itself and interconnected with all the others constitutes the bases 
for what it has been argued to be the systemic view of crisis as well as an inte-
grated crisis management approach (Jaques, 2009; Gundel 2005; Brown, 2002; 
‘t Hart & Boin, 2001; Penrose, 2000; Pauchant & Mitro!, 1992; Phelps, 1986).
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Figure 2 – Crises Portfolio
Source: Mitroff (2004)
It has been empirically tested that any crisis member of the clusters can be in 
the same time the cause or even the e!ect of any other crisis and that technical 
and social factors are so interconnected and linked that it is almost impos-
sible to say that a trigger of a major crisis was technical or social in its nature 
(Pauchant & Mitro!, 1992). Moreover management scholars have argued that 
crises can be considered as normal events that are triggered by both the com-
plexity of the system and the faulty rationalizations, as well as by the intercon-
nected and interlinked relationship of technological systems and the humans 
who manage them (Pauchant & Mitro!, 1990; Mitro! et al., 1988a; Mitro! et 
al., 1988b). 
#e circular, cyclical and amplifying way in which the phenomenon of crisis 
usually acts has been argued and empirically tested (Jaques, 2009; Hale et al., 
2005; Penrose, 2000; Darling, 1994). As Pauchant and Mitro! (1992) describe 
“a crisis is ill structured, systemic, and messy” (p.29). #e tendency of manag-
ers to look at the crisis in a very narrow way and to focus only on some aspects 
186 | Ramona PERGEL, Alexandros G. PSYCHOGIOS (2013)
Making Sense of Crisis: Cognitive Barriers of Learning in Critical Situations
of the outcome crisis could induce, such as engineering or %nance, is one of 
the drivers that creates the e!ect of their vulnerability to crisis. Managers’ fail-
ure to look at the crisis in a systemic view creates the crisis-proneness of the 
organizations (Jaques, 2008; Brown, 2002). 
Last but not least, the systemic view argues that small changes in some vari-
ables of the system can amplify their e!ect if in$uenced by other variables. It 
is what in the theory of chaos is called the butter$y e!ect [2], described for 
the %rst time by Lorenz (1963). In a similar approach, the authors of man-
agement science (Obolenski, 2010; Smith & Sipika, 2003; Weick, 1988) have 
drawn the attention of danger that occurs in tight coupling large systems that 
are particularly prone to disasters due to their complex interactions, where as 
a change in one variable can trigger changes in other variables which %nally 
can lead to the breakdown of the entire system, in the absence of regulation. 
The complexity view
As argued in the previous subsection, unfortunately managers tend to omit 
the multifaceted view of the crisis and see only the restricted number of its 
e!ects, attempting though to implement additional control mechanisms. One 
of the most erroneous misconceptions when referring to crisis is that manage-
ment refuses to see it as a positive force, “as a factor in itself contributing to 
the existence of the enterprise” (Pauchant & Mitro!, 1992, p.20). We are of the 
opinion of the authors that stated that crises have to be seen both as a positive 
as well as negative force acting towards the organization, both danger but also 
opportunity, where as the successful development of the organization can be 
conditioned by the destructive side of the crisis in itself (Pauchant & Mitro!, 
1992; Pauchant & Mitro!, 1990). 
#is critical paradox have been addressed by few authors (Schwartz, 1987; 
Sievers, 1986) arguing that construction and destruction, life and death, order 
and chaos, business as usual and crisis have to be seen as a whole and not as 
opposites. Life and death in this complementary view is an old philosophi-
cal concept. We are strongly on the opinion that it is this paradox, this mis-
conception of crisis and order that is the single most important reason why 
today’s organizations are not crisis-prepared. As described by Pauchant and 
Mitro! (1992) there are three di!erent crisis management approaches that, 
even though do not completely embrace the Heraclitus view of crises, are try-
ing to point more or less in the same direction: (i) the management group that 
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see crises as normal accidents resulting only from complexity of technology, 
(ii) the second group that embrace a more political and socio-psychological 
view that considers crisis as an outcome of faulty decisions placing though 
the responsibility on individuals and (iii) the last group which is attempting 
to integrate both of the previous perspectives and thus considering crises as 
normal events but triggered by both system complexity and faulty decisions, 
technological as well as human interrelationships. We are on the side of the 
last management approach that looks to crisis in a more integrated perspec-
tive and sees both the “element of determinism” and “free will” (Pauchant & 
Mitro!, 1992, p.22) in the sense that the organizational system is very much 
in$uenced by its own complexity where order and chaos in$uence each vari-
able within it and where human decisions can be in the same time potential 
for disasters and also potential for resolutions. 
#e Heraclitus view of complexity is nothing else but another way of arguing 
on the necessity to see the crisis in a systemic view, as we have argued in the 
previous subchapter. #e complexity view sees the interrelationship between 
numerous variables that constitutes the whole system, but also sees the para-
doxical nature of each variable comprising both the source of chaos and order 
(Stacey, 2003). We thus argue that it is absolutely necessary that a systemic 
view is followed in order to look at the phenomena of crisis urging us to un-
derstand how a change in one variable can a!ect the entire system, having 
in mind that a change in one variable is in$uenced and ampli%ed by other 
variables. In other words, the systemic view looks on how one or more events 
can trigger certain patterns of interactions in the system. #e complexity of 
the systems and their complicated, dynamic and interconnected nature make 
human interaction extremely di"cult and attempts to correct them fail most 
of the times. It is this vicious circle that originates in the systems self-feeding 
the crisis phenomena. 
Organizations are living organisms that, in order to stay alive and properly 
function, need both integrative as well as destructive forces. #e latter are ob-
viously more present and visible in the times of crises, yet their presence has 
to be seen as both a prerequisite for the life of the system itself, as well as its 
doom. #e intellectual, emotional and existential recognition of the fragility 
of life and its paradoxical nature represent the psychological keystone of crisis 
management. Managers play a very important role in accepting this paradoxi-
cal interplay between chaos and order, life and death, creation and destruc-
tion. We argue that managers in crisis-prepared organizations do their best 
to reduce the likelihood of crises to occur and if so, to cope with their e!ects, 
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whereas managers in crisis-prone organizations completely deny the possibil-
ity that crises can occur and if so, they are able to manage them through in-
creased control mechanism or, even more, invoking fate as the perfect excuse 
for not being able to do anything about it. 
We argue that managers follow this paradoxical Heraclitian view of crisis. 
And this is mostly because the fundamental of this view sees crises not only as 
being normal events in the life of the organizations, but being life-enhancing 
and that individuals have to do their best to reduce the e!ects of crisis, even 
though past available knowledge may be incomplete or not suited for the par-
ticular situation. #erefore, there is a need of a more integrated conceptualiza-
tion of crisis and its management.  
Conceptualizing crisis: the Onion Model 
Pauchant and Mitro! (1988, 1992) provided one of the most in-depth exami-
nations of the crises phenomenon and developed a diagnosis model of crises 
management, meant to help managers determining their crises prone or pre-
paredness of their organizations: the so-called Onion Model of Crises Manage-
ment. #ey argued that in order for managers to conduct such a diagnosis it 
is necessary to examine the organization at four di!erent levels: strategies, 
structures, culture and individuals’ subjective beliefs and assumptions (see 
Figure 3). Moreover they have empirically proved that change in an organiza-
tion that is crisis-prone occurs only at the super%cial level of the structures 
and plans, rather than in the very heart of the onion where collective and 
individual beliefs and assumptions lies: “crises prone organizations have insti-
tutionalized ‘sickness’ in their culture, thus making it acceptable; furthermore 
they have put tremendous pressure on ‘normal’ individuals to become ‘sick’ in 
order to %t in…it is not what members of the family do that leads to disaster: 
it is how they are” (Pauchant and Mitro!, 1992, pp.172-173). 
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Figure 3 – Onion Model of Crisis Management 
Source: Pauchant and Mitroff (1988)
#e Onion Model of Crisis Management sits in the core of our case study 
analysis being the basis for the research methodology. It is considered and we 
strongly agree with this argument that there are four key factors that can de-
termine an organization to be either crisis-prone or crisis-prepared. As these 
factors are uncovered one a&er the other in a sequential way the resemblance 
with the layers of the onion has been done, therefore we will also address them 
as layers: (i) layer 1: the individuals beliefs and defence mechanisms; (ii) layer 
2: organizational beliefs and rationalization; (iii) layer 3: organizational in-
frastructure dedicated for crisis management; (iv) layer 4: plans, mechanisms 
and procedures for crisis management. 
All the four layers are very important and need separate attention, yet, for the 
purpose of our analysis we will address in more depth layer 2 and, especially 
layer 1, as we strongly believe that an organization, per se, cannot be crisis-
prepared or crisis prone, only the individuals in it can %nally in$uence the 
crisis perspective of an organization, as well as be able to either foster or resist 
crisis management e!orts. #ese two layers represent the unconscious and 
invisible aspects of the organization, being without any doubt the hardest to 
be seen and to be tackled.
Layer 3 and 4 are the most visible part of the Onion Model, even for an out-
sider of the organization. Layer’s 4 plans, mechanisms and procedures are ac-
tually the crisis management strategy of the organization and this is really the 
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outmost layer and the most easily one to be seen. Layer 3 represents in fact the 
structure of the organization, both in the sense of its tangible elements such 
as rules of authority and power (the formal hierarchy), as well as internals 
norms and regulations, but also more symbolic functions such as degree of 
formalization and the control mechanisms that can indicate the level of trust 
that exists in the organization. What it needs to be said about layer 3 is that 
while it is very easy from an outsider to see the structure of the organization it 
is, ironically, sometimes more di"cult for the individuals to understand how 
structure a!ects their way of working. Both layers (strategy and structure) are 
strongly related and can in$uence each other in an interactive manner. 
All the four layers are interconnected with each other and are in$uencing each 
other implying a mixture of individual, organizational, structural and tech-
nological factors. Yet it has been argued that companies with a high degree of 
technical orientation (like the one that our Company entails – gas distribution 
network operator) face greater di"culties in crisis management, and this is 
mostly due to the fact that usually they are very well doing on the technical 
factors (layer 3 and 4) but they de%nitively tend to act poor on the human 
factors (layer 1 and 2) (Desai, 2010). Above all, this model links crisis with a 
continuous learning process clearly. 
Crisis and learning 
Although the relationship between crisis and learning remains still unclear in 
literature, there are scholars that highlight the e!ects that crisis situation have 
on learning and change (Veil, 2011; Deverell, 2009; Dillon & Tinsley, 2008; 
Lalonde, 2007; Smith & Elliott, 2007; Popper & Lipshitz, 2000; Crossan et al., 
1999; Fiol & Lyles, 1985; March & Olsen, 1975). Schwab (2007) stated that 
organizational learning occurs “when experience systematically alters behav-
iours” (p.233) which indicates that that the process of organizational learning 
is clearly distinguished between the cognition and behaviour, as well as be-
tween lessons observed (that do not change the actual behaviour) and lessons 
implemented (that actually change the individual and the organizations). 
#e most important factors that drive and in$uence the organizational behav-
iour is represented by the less observable, much unconscious ones referred 
to as “culture of the organization” (Mitro! et al., 1989, p.271), individuals, 
as human factors and organizations combined. Culture can thus be de%ned 
as a set of hardly articulated and largely unconscious beliefs, norms, values 
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and assumptions that the organization held about it, its environment and the 
nature of people in general. As Pauchant and Mitro! (1988) said: “culture is to 
an organization what personality is to an individual” (p.54). So as most of the 
individual personality aspects are unconscious, much of the organizations are 
not aware of the most important forces that in$uence their actions, operating 
in a more basic take-it-for-granted manner. 
A theoretical model that raised extreme interest for the purposes of the pres-
ent case study analyses is the one developed by Crossan et al. (1999) named 
“the 4Is framework of organizational learning”. #e model consists in present-
ing the organizational learning as four processes – Intuiting, Interpreting, 
Integrating, and Institutionalizing – linking the Individual, Group and Or-
ganizational levels. #e model argues for a continued and dynamic learning 
process and that learning do not occur only over time and across the three 
levels but creates “a tension between assimilating new learning (feed forward) 
and exploiting or using what has already been learned (feedback)” (p.532). 
It has been argued that the model (Table 1) is able to identify the $ow of learn-
ing in the sense that ideas occur to individuals and that individuals share these 
ideas among them through the process of integrating; the social dynamic pro-
cess through which individuals and groups interact, may facilitate or inhibit 
the learning process; when ultimately learning become institutionalized at 
the organizational level is very o&en di"cult to change. How managers can 
in$uence the learning mechanism along all four processes and throughout 
all three levels is a matter that has not been empirically tested. While using 
the four processes of intuiting, interpreting, integrating and institutionalizing 
throughout all the three dimensions of individual, groups and organizational 
level, we consider that the model o!ers good analysis grounds for possible 
cognitive barriers that might occur in the process of learning from crisis situ-
ation, considering the Pauchant and Mitro! (1992) Onion Model of Crises 
Management layers (individual defence mechanisms and groups/organiza-
tional beliefs and assumptions) while looking to the learning from crisis pro-
cess involving the re$ection on “sense-making”. 
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Table 1 – The 4Is Framework of Organizational Learning
Source: Crossan et al. (1999)
Based on the previously mentioned Onion Model of Crisis Management and 
considering Turner’s (1976) seminal work regarding full cultural readjust-
ment, we are fully in line with the scholars that sustained the idea that the 
e!ective organizational learning from crises requires changes in the core be-
liefs, values and assumptions of organizational members which translates into 
sustained behavioural changes (Aspaslan, 2009; Aspaslan et al., 2009; Smith 
& Elliot, 2007; Elliot & Smith, 2006; Elliott et al., 2000; Turner, 1994; Turner, 
1976). Yet, as it is an ideal to believe in Turner’s (1976) full cultural adjust-
ment capability of the organizations, it is the author’s opinion that this is being 
rarely achieved. When analysing the learning from crisis phenomena there 
is a clear need to address questions like what is leaned out of the crisis situ-
ations (single-loop leaning when individuals detect and correct the $aws in 
the organization but do not question the basic norms or double-loop learning 
is achieved when inquiries made by individuals within the organization take 
form of restructuring its prevailing norms and assumption), what is the focus 
of learning (is it prevention in the sense of %nding the cause and making sure 
that it will not occur again or is it reaction and response when the actions of 
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the individuals are aimed to just minimize the consequences) and is learning 
implemented (both cognition – changes in the state of knowledge - and behav-
iour – changes in the organizational overall outcome). Concerns have been 
raised in terms of both cognition and behaviour level when real crisis events 
happen (Bartunek & Moch, 1987; Staw et al., 1981), namely the fact that even 
though learning from crisis occurs it does not necessarily mean that it leads 
to improved performance, moreover the changed behaviour does not nec-
essarily re$ects the re$ection of cognition and vice-versa. #e same authors 
concluded that, in response to external threats and failures, it is very o&en 
that managers tend to response as a re$ex reaction in a mechanic adaptation, 
rather than engaging in analytical analyses and re$ective cognition. 
We agree with the part of the literature pertaining opportunities for learning 
from crisis situations that may arise in all the three stages of crisis, but it is the 
post-crisis moment (crisis of legitimation) that represents the most common 
moment when learning is expected to occur; concerns are to be considered to 
the possible series of cognitive processes that may contribute to the preven-
tion of organizational learning and so the existence of barriers to learning 
from crisis situations (Elliott, 2009; Smith & Elliott, 2007; Wicks, 2001), as 
well as the danger that such barriers act like real inhibitors to an enhancing 
resilience organizational capacities (Stein, 2008; Boin & McConnell, 2007). 
Within a crisis-prone organization, the resistance to change is more visible at 
the structures and plans, organizational practices and behaviours, whereas all 
these are ultimately determined by the individual and collective beliefs. Only 
learning that challenge the core organizational paradigm provide the basis of 
a full cultural readjustment (Smith, 2002). 
Barriers to learning 
#e emphasis of cognitive elements of organizations and institutions is be-
coming increasingly relevant from the perspective that sees and recognizes 
the individuals’ role in “understanding and prescribing meanings to the so-
cial context” (Wicks, 2001, p.22). #us it has been agreed that individuals’, ei-
ther managers or lower level organizational members, construction of reality 
might be distorted “through frames or schema that are used to organize and 
interpret knowledge” (Elliott et al, 2000, p. 21). 
#ere are several cognitive and cultural barriers generally presented in the 
crises management literature as blocking the learning process and creating 
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the danger for a crises prone organization (Fischbacher-Smith & Fischbacher-
Smith, 2009; Goyal & Kulkarni, 2009; Reason, 1995; Tombs & Smith, 1995; 
Pauchant & Douville, 1993, Turner, 1976). Although it is very di"cult to draw 
a clear line between which of the barriers are developed strictly at the cogni-
tive individual level and which are embedded in the organizational culture, 
defence routines and schemata, as well as it is pretty much argued that most 
of them can be group around or associated with the rigid core beliefs and as-
sumptions of the individuals, for the sake of clarity we shall try to group them 
in separate clusters.
#us a %rst set of barriers are related to the rigidity of core beliefs, values and 
assumptions/ lack of social corporate responsibility, namely the issue of denial 
that create problems of sense making of the situations that are not as they 
usual are and the creation of deeply held values and assumptions. Social re-
sponsibility argument is used to surface the constraints around the rigid core 
beliefs, values and assumptions. 
#e second category is referring to ine#ective communication and information 
di!culties, in very close connection with a third category of denial, centrality 
of expertise and disregard of outsiders, whereas either the information made 
available will hinder the identi%cation of vulnerabilities (through making is-
sues “un-discussable”) or the language of the discourse is very technical for 
the non-experts and the use of scienti%c evidences is considered as needed to 
support the core paradigm (which mainly a!ects and will lead to the exclusion 
of the outside stakeholders).
#e next cluster of barriers consists in maladaptation, threat minimization and 
environmental shi$s which represents an emergent property of the %rst two 
categories of barriers, namely the rigid core values and beliefs and ine!ective 
communication. #is set of barriers mainly re$ects the use of both temporal 
and special factors to deny the possibility and existence of the worse-case sce-
nario or the tendency to give very limited attention to the lessons learned to 
previous events or near misses. 
Event %xation and cognitive narrowing relates to the faulty assumption that 
crisis are unique events thus hindering the learning process. #e “it couldn’t 
happen here” syndrome prevents managers from analysing cues from events 
that happened elsewhere.
Peripheral inquiry and the decoy phenomena lead to failures of organizations 
to identity the real threats, allowing the blame culture and “scapegoating” 
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phenomena to develop and thus inhibiting the search for e!ective root causes 
of the events. 
Last but not least the tendency to focus of single loop learning and not on dou-
ble-loop learning. #is barrier mitigates for the inability of the organizations 
to challenge the dominant paradigm that may very well be the one that caused 
the failure in the %rst place. 
Alongside the above-mentioned barriers, managers are thought to play an 
important role in the learning process and the creation of the organization 
pathways of vulnerabilities (Smith and Elliott, 2007; Smith, 2005; Elliott et 
al., 2000; Hynes & Prasad, 1997; Turner, 1994; Mitro! et al., 1989; Starbuck 
et al., 1978). Much too o&en in the crisis legitimation phase the reality is con-
structed through the lens of the powerful as those in these positions of power 
and authority o&en re-write the history so as to serve their interest. Managers 
are believed to have a high in$uence over the judgment taken around the so-
called “acceptable” levels of risks. #eir deep core beliefs, values and assump-
tions are long considered as important in incubating the potential for crisis 
situations, as well as their ability to shape the defences that are put in place. In 
other words, they need to make sense of crisis in order to deal with it. 
Sense-making and the process of learning 
#e issue of managers’ sense-making in crisis situation is argued to be a very 
critical and important element in the learning process (Weick, 1993; Weick, 
1988). It is generally accepted that crises, most of the times, engage human 
actions and these can be easily ampli%ed from a simple deviation to a ma-
jor crisis situation. It is this “crisis in motion” situation that creates the need 
for “sense-making” that play an important role in both genesis of crisis and 
management and prevention of it, if understood (Veil, 2011; Deverell, 2009; 
Spitzeck, 2009; Muhren et al., 2008; Weick et al., 2005; Nathan, 2004; Crossan 
et al., 1999; Savolainen, 1993; #omas et al., 1993; Weick, 1988). As Weick 
(1988) sustained, and we agree with it, “if we can understand the process of 
sense-making during a crisis, then we can develop people to prevent larger 
crises by smarter management of small crises” (p.308). 
Organizational members and, particularly, managers need to continuously 
make sense of their own conduct in order to coordinate and organize tasks. 
#e basic principle of the organizing process is the on-going reproduction of 
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commonly held and shared reality through routines and standards. #e only 
possibility an organization changes is when routines are challenged or new 
standards and procedure are introduced (Holmqvist, 2004; Argyris, 1977). 
Alongside the learning process to adapt to changing conditions, it needs re-
$ection on sense-making (in the sense of questioning whether driving to the 
chosen direction makes sense) and only then the organization is challenging 
to change the core beliefs and assumptions, as well as its speci%c view over the 
outside world. 
Sense-making represents the ability of an individual to make sense of cir-
cumstances based on personal interpretation and past experience (Weick et 
al., 2005; Weick, 1988). It is a continuum and interplay between interpreta-
tion and action. Yet it has been argued that action determines the situation, 
whereas preconceptions determine the appropriate action (Staw et al., 1981). 
#e process of understanding (making sense) is facilitated by action, whereas 
action can a!ect events and make things even worse. Cognition lies in the 
path of action, but it is well argued that action precedes and focuses cognition 
(Weick, 1988). 
Weick (1995) has distinguished seven di!erent properties of sense-making: 
identity constructing, enactment, social context, on-going understanding, cue 
extraction, plausibility. All these properties taken together are suggesting that 
sense-making should only occur when individuals are socializing in order to 
make things done, be resilient, keep showing up, treat constraints as being 
self-imposed and use retrospective to get the sense of the direction. As Weick 
et al (2005) stated “these are micro-level actions. #ey are small actions. But 
they are small actions with large consequences” (p.419). We have tried in Ta-
ble 2 below to summarize all seven properties of sense-making.
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Table 2 – Sense-making Properties
Source: Weick (1995)
Sense-making represents a meta-cognitive framework used to “get a grip on 
the equivocal external environment and its proneness to multiple interpreta-
tions” (Muhren et al., 2008, p.200). Questions like “what is happening out 
there?”, “why it is happening?” or “what does it mean?” are frequently ad-
dressed through a sense-making process (Weick et al., 2005). #e basic com-
ponents of sense-making are information seeking, creating, processing and 
using (#omas et al., 1993) as well as comprising intuitions, opinions, e!ective 
responses, evaluations and questions (Crossan et al., 1999; Savolainen, 1993). 
As Weick (2005) has stated in its ground-breaking work, “sense-making is 
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also to understand how people cope with interruptions” (p.5). #ese interrup-
tions, situations when individuals are confronted with ill-structured problems 
and ambiguity, are most evident in crisis situations in which continuity is an 
exception while discontinuity becomes the rule, and this is the reason why 
sense-making is of particularly relevance.
It is argued that meaning to a given situation (e.g. crisis situation) is guided 
by organizing frameworks or schemata (Bartunek & Moch, 1987): “Schemata 
therefore guide people as they attend to some aspects of their experiences 
and, by implication, ignore others” (p.485). Individuals in the organization 
o&en continue to use out-dated schemata and no longer will reach to con-
structive solutions (Nystrom & Starbuck, 1984), as well as they engage in the 
same behaviours that led to the negative consequences rather than challeng-
ing their core beliefs that actually drove the unproductive behaviours. To 
synthesize: 
1. people see the world through their own motives and based on patterns 
of old experience that will in$uence how they will view future experienc-
es (and this is mostly revealed in crisis situation which are newsworthy 
events); 
2. “we experience the world by creating categories and making distinctions 
among them” (Langer, 1989 cited in Veil, 2011, p.124), as we recognize 
only what we are expecting to see and act in a routine fashion;
3. people tend to see only what they expect to see within their “box” and are 
blind to conditions that do not %t inside this box; they construct an expect-
ed world as the present one is too complex to handle and thus process only 
the information that %ts to the expected world, %nding reasons to exclude 
information that might contradict it; 
Cognitive barriers that have been revealed in the crisis management literature 
as being the most powerful barriers to learning from past crisis experience sit-
uations can only be addressed and understood through the concept of sense-
making. “Actions devoted to sense-making play a central role in the genesis 
of crisis and therefore need to be understood if we are to manage and prevent 
crisis” (Weick, 1988, p.308). By not making sense of complex events like crisis 
situations, failure to remember these events or labelling them as “black swans” 
(events that are viewed as outliers in not plausible) (Taleb, 2010) managers 
run into risks of failing to e!ectively learn lessons about the underlining pro-
cesses that created these adverse events in the %rst place. 
Volume 1 (2013) no. 2, pp. 179-205; www.managementdynamics.ro
Management Dynamics in the Knowledge Economy | 199
Conclusions
Crisis is de%nitively capable to provide stimulus that generates shi&s within 
organizations. #e way it does this is especially by revealing and highlighting 
the limitations of existing and prevailing norms, beliefs and practices of the 
organizations and its members (Huberman, 2001; Levitt & March, 1988). Un-
derstanding this and acknowledging the need for change stays in the ability of 
managers to %lter, interpret and make-sense of the crisis situation. Fail to do 
this e!ectively will lead to failure to learn from crisis and so create the crisis 
proneness and vulnerability of the organization itself.
As revealed in the present paper it is clear that considerable attention and re-
search needs to be done in order to assess the manner in which organizations 
can e!ectively learn to prevent crisis situations, addressing the theoretical 
frameworks that analyse the barriers that might occur in the learning from cri-
sis process at an individual and group level, pointing out the need of recognition 
and sense-making that sometimes the current state of knowledge is not well. 
Yet, less consideration has been given to the role of cognitive issues in learning 
from crisis situations and in particular to the role of managers mental repre-
sentation of crisis and the relationship of these maps with the learning process 
through sense-making, while considering the individual defence mechanisms 
and the possible faulty beliefs, assumptions and rationalizations present at the 
group and organizational level. Moreover, there is less evidence on the exist-
ing knowledge on crisis and crisis management, as well as on organizational 
learning from crisis in companies acting in the Southern Eastern European 
environment.
Last but not least, the study argues that the e!ective organizational learning 
from crises requires intense cognitive processes of the managers “making-
sense” of crises situations thus enabling changes in the core beliefs, values and 
assumptions of organizational members %nally translated into sustained be-
havioural changes. Managers’ mental representation of crisis through “sense-
making” is able to both facilitate the process of organizational learning from 
crisis situations and also to reveal the existence of possible cognitive barriers 
to learning from crises situations. #e study argues that failing in addressing 
these barriers may contribute to the prevention of organizational learning. 
In sum, this paper tries to bridge these gaps by providing the basis of a future 
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research since there is a pressing need to ensure greater empirical testing and 
validation of the main learning from crisis concepts. 
Endnotes
[1] When referring to “Big Picture” Mitro! has envisaged the systemic approach on hav-
ing the overview of the organization; the “Big Picture” is a concept which is represented by 
two of the Jung/Myers Briggs systems/dimensions of psychological language: Big Picture 
– #ing (Intuitive #inking) and Big-Picture People (Intuitive Feeling).  
[2] #e theory suggests that the $ap of a butter$y wing in one part of the world can trigger 
a large atmospheric change like a cyclone in another part.
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